风险资本进入新媒体企业的双重委托代理问题研究

The Study on Double Principal-Agent Problem of Venture Capital into New Media Enterprise

基于新媒体经济与文化双重属性,其发展须置于政府监控之下。风险资本进入新媒体企业时,政府和风险资本家作为委托人与新媒体经营者之间形成双重委托代理关系。政府与风险资本家分别在非合作与合作状态下的激励模型分析结果表明:非合作状态下,每个委托人增加自身利益的行为对其他的委托人都有负外部效应;而在合作状态下,双方组成一个协同整体,根据经营者工作职能效率的情况,适当调整激励强度,实现双赢。

New media has the economic attributes and cultural attributes, so its development must be under government supervision. When the venture capital enters new media, government and venture capitalists as double client form a Double Principal-Agent relationship with the new media operators~ In this paper, the incentive models of the Government and the venture capitalists under the state of non-cooperative and cooperation have been analyzed, and the results show that, under the condition of the non-cooperative, increasing each client＇s own interest has negative external effects to other clients; however in cooperation state, if the two sides form a synergistic whole, it would realize a win-win situ- ation when adjusting the intensity of incentives appropriately according to the operators work efficiency.