全流通背景下的上市公司控制权争夺研究

Competition for Ownership of Listed Companies in the Era of Complete Liquidity

本文在前人研究基础上提出新的股权制衡模型,研究在全流通背景下的上市公司控制权争夺问题,证明:在风险中性和不存在交易成本的条件下,大股东调整股权比例的唯一目的就是获得控制权,在控制权不发生转移的情况下,制衡型的股权结构是稳定的;在考虑风险和交易成本时,股权结构稳定与否取决于风险和交易成本的大小,较高的交易成本或较大的风险厌恶程度,将阻止控制权的转移,反之则有利于交易的进行;在控制权争夺中,大股东获得控制权的能力与其经营能力和道德水平正相关。

The article presents a module of balanced ownership structure to analyze the competition for ownership of listed companies in the era of complete liquidity. The conclusions are that with neutral risk and no transaction cost, large shareholders would adjust their ownership only to be in control. While there is no shift in ownership, the ownership structure is stable. If risk and transaction cost are taken into account, the stability of ownership structure will depend on the level of risk and transaction cost. The more effectively the large shareholder operates, and the higher ethics level it holds, the more likely that it would be in control.