商业银行股权结构对代理成本影响的实证研究

An Empirical Study of the Impact of Ownership Structure on Agency Cost in Commercial Banks

采用面板数据模型实证检验了商业银行股权结构对权益代理成本的影响,以期寻找股权多元化背景下影响委托—代理问题的决定性因素,发现股权治理机制的完善路径。研究表明:当内部法人机制不健全时,"一股独大"具有存在意义。但随着资本充足率提高,委托—代理矛盾可能更为突出。国家在对国有商业银行实施资本救助的同时,应加强资金运用的监管,防止国有资产流失。

By utilizing Panel data model, this thesis empirically examines the impact of ownership structure on equity agency cost in commercial banks, in the hope of exploring the decisive factors affecting entrusting-agency problem under diversified ownership, which is helpful to find the way of perfecting ownership governance mechanism. The research shows that the ＂big state-owned shareholders＂ significantly exists in distempered corporation where the ＂insider control＂ problem might be even more serious. However, with capital efficiency ratio improved, the ent/usting-agency contradiction will become more outstanding. It means that the government should strengthen the supervision on injected capital and prevent the mass eroding of national assets when saving state-owned commercial banks from bankruptcy.