上市公司过度投资行为及其治理机制的实证研究

An Empirical Research on the Over-Investment Behavior and Its Governance in China's Listed Companies

针对我国上市公司频繁发生非效率投资行为的现状,分析其是否存在过度投资行为以及过度投资行为的治理机制。研究结果显示,我国上市公司确实存在过度投资行为,且负债对过度投资有约束作用;非国有控股和现金股利能制约过度投资行为,但影响有限;经理持股与独立董事对过度投资行为没有显著影响;增量融资与投资显著正相关,且其影响最为显著。因此,现阶段的首要任务是完善资本市场,使其能起到合理配置资源的功效。

In considering the frequently inefficient investment status quo in China＇ s listed companies, this paper aims to analyze whether they have over-investment behavior and what corresponding governance can be adopted to govern the over-investment behavior. The research results show that there are over-investments in China＇s listed companies and liabilities may have a binding effect on them; Cash dividend and non-state-owned holding share have limited effects on over-investments whereas the managerial ownership and independent directors have no significant effects on over-investments. Furthermore, increment financing has a significant correlation with investment. Therefore, at the present stage, the first mission of our government is to improve capital market construction, so that caoital market can reasonably collocate financial resources.