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一种基于诚实机制的最优负载分配方法

Optimized load allocation method based on truthful mechanism
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摘要 为了激励代理参与机制合作和提高系统性能,提出一种新的最优负载分配算法;对输出函数的单调性给出一种新的、简单的证明方法;给出机制设计及实现方法。理论分析及仿真实验结果表明,应用该机制设计,可以激励计算机代理诚实地向系统报告它们的类型值(计算机真实的处理能力),以最小化系统总体响应时间;该任务分配算法优于现有的同类算法。 Dealing with selfish users had been well-studied in game theory and economics. In order to encourage the coopera- tion between agents with mechanism and improve system performance, this paper proposed a new algorithm to solve the opti- mized load balancing allocation problem; presented an novel, simple and intuitive proof for the monotonieity of output function; proposed the method of designing mechanism and implementing mechanism. Finally, analysed the efficiency of the proposed mechanism and the performance of the proposed algorithm through experiments. The experimental results show that the pro- posed mechanism may motivate computers to report their type values that minimizes the overall expected response time of the system, and the proposed algorithm has improved performance titan the related proposed algorithms.
出处 《计算机应用研究》 CSCD 北大核心 2009年第4期1471-1475,1479,共6页 Application Research of Computers
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70661001) 贵州省自然科学基金资助项目(黔基合计字(2003)3069号)
关键词 博弈论 机制设计 诚实机制 个人理性机制 激励相容机制 game theory mechanism design truthful mechanism individual rationality mechanism incentive compatible mechanism
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参考文献16

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