期货市场监管层与投资者的信息博弈分析——兼论期货市场过度投机的动因

An Analysis on the Information Game of Futures Market Supervisors and Investors—Motivation of Over-Speculation

信息博弈是参与期货市场博弈的各个主体在包括信息产生、信息传播和信息利用在内的期货信息运行体系中,围绕信息的真实性、完整性、及时性和有效性进行的博弈。在过度投机的市场环境下,由于期货市场监管层与投资主体各自的风险偏好不同,它们对市场投机氛围的把握尺度也迥异,这就在期货市场监管层与投资主体之间产生了信息博弈。对期货市场监管层与投资主体之间信息博弈的分析表明,过度投机行为屡禁不止的根本原因并非仅源于投资主体的"逐利偏好",还源于投资主体因生存考验而表现出的对监管层的"主动示好",从而赢得监管层的"良心庇护"。因此,只有协力打击过度投机行为,强化市场监管合作,才能保证期货市场持续、稳定、健康发展。

Information game refers to different participant subjects rival through facility,integrity,timeliness,and validity of information in the system of futures information operation including information production,communication and information practice. Under the circumstances of futures market over-speculation,the risk preference and perception differences between supervisors and investors lead an information game between the two parties. Our analysis show that the rationale of over-speculation consists of investors' perception toward supervisors' 'active friendship' as well as investors' 'profitability preference'. Thus,the sustainable stability needs joint efforts to combat over-speculation and enforce supervision cooperation.