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从股权结构特征对控股股东掠夺问题的影响研究 被引量:1

To Study on Influencing from Equity Structure Character for the Control Shareholders Plundering Problem
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摘要 控股股东对中小投资者的利益掠夺已经成为公司治理的突出问题。产权理论认为所有权与控制权的不对称是造成利益侵占问题的根本原因。包括控股股东持股比例,控制方式和股权制衡状况等内容的所有权结构特征,作为一种重要的公司治理机制,在很大程度上影响了控股股东的掠夺行为。据此提出了完善股权治理的对策。 It becomes important problem in corporate governance about small shareholders' interests expropriated by Control sharehoiders.With: point of view of property right theory,Lack of balance with equity and control rights become basic reason on expropriation. EqUity structure character includes the proportion of control Shareholder, the style of control and the degree of equity balance,which is an important system of corporate governance,affect on behaviors of control shareholders. On the base this paper argues some measures improving equity governance.
作者 杜湘红
出处 《价值工程》 2009年第2期153-155,共3页 Value Engineering
基金 湖南教育厅课题"基于行为法经济学的公司治理法律环境问题研究(06C547)" 湖南省社科基金"基于行为法经济学的公司治理监管问题研究(06ZC27)"资助项目
关键词 股权结构 公司治理 掠夺 equity structure corporate governance plundering
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参考文献4

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