竞选村委会主任的博弈分析

To Analyse Game of Running for the Village Committee Chief

利用博弈论,建立竞选村委会主任的博弈模型,分析指出:在完全信息正当拉票情况下,选出来的村委会主任素质比较好;在不完全信息的情况下,不正当和隐蔽拉票行为所选出来的村委会主任可能不能胜任。但是,一旦隐蔽的不正当拉票行为消失,竞选活动就趋于正当拉票的混合战略纳什均衡。所以,为了维护竞选活动的公开、公平和公正性,我国必须制定相关法律去界定和制止隐蔽的不正当拉票行为。

This thesis set up a game theory model of running for village committee chief,analyzed and pointed out：under the conditions of complete information and the just canvassing,the diathesis of the village committee chief is better;under the incomplete information condition,the village committee chief elected by unjust and covert canvassing will be not competence. But the race activities will tend to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if the covert and unjust canvassing disappear.To maintain the publicity, impartiality and justness of the race activities,our country have to make relevant laws to define and restrain the unjust and covert canvassing activities.