寻租下的政府监管龙头企业责任履行的博弈分析

An Analysis on the Game Behavior between Governmental Supervision and the Leading Enterprises' Responsibility Fulfillment against the Rent-seeking Background

财政扶持农业产业化龙头企业的出发点是通过龙头企业的壮大带动农民增收。然而,龙头企业在利润最大化的驱动下,会充分利用信息不对称从事不履行带动农民增收的可能。财政监管部门虽然对企业的这类行为进行监管,但在存在寻租的情况下,财政监管部门可能会接受"租金"而不对企业进行查处。所以要从博弈论的视角,对这一经济现象及其影响因素进行分析,以探索遏制企业寻租行为的制度创新途径。

The aim of the public financial support to agricultural industrialized leading enterprises is to increase farmers income through leading enterprises＇strength. However, with the max -profit pursuing, the leading enterprises will not choose to fulfill the responsibility of leading farmer to increase income with the asymmetrical information. Although the financial supervisory departments should implement supervision over these enterprises, against the rent - seeking background, it is possible that the finance supervisory departments accept ＂ seeks＂ and fail to carry out the investigation to the enterprises. This paper analyzes this economic phenomena and the influencing factors based on the game theory so as to explore the institutional innovation to reduce the rent - seek behavior.