期刊文献+

企业集团高管人员股权激励与绩效--基于中国上市母子公司的比较研究 被引量:5

Ownership Motivation on Top Managers and Firm Performance in Chinese Business Groups: A Comparative Analysis between Headquarters and Subsidiaries
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摘要 通过对中国651家上市企业集团的母公司和子公司进行比较分析,发现母公司绩效优于子公司。母公司中,管理层持股数量与企业每股收益和净资产收益率正相关;子公司中管理层持股数量与每股收益和主营业务收益率正相关。另外研究发现,无论是母公司还是子公司,管理层持股的人数比例与企业绩效没有显著相关性。 This paper focuses on the relationship between ownership motivation on top managers and firm performance in Chinese business groups. Through a comparative analysis of headquarters and subsidiaries in Chinese 661 public companies, it is found that headquarters having better performance than subsidiaries in business groups in China. The quantity ratio of managerial shares is positively related to earning on per share and return on net asset in headquarters and to return on core business in subsidiaries. Besides, the population ratio of managerial shareholders shows no significant relationship with firm performance no matter in headquarters or in subsidiaries.
出处 《科学学与科学技术管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第4期171-175,共5页 Science of Science and Management of S.& T.
基金 国家自然科学基金重点项目“新形势下中国企业整合战略与动态竞争研究”(70832003) 教育部哲学社会科学研究重大攻关项目“经济全球化环境下中国企业集团的成长与重组”(04JZD0018) 教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”项目(NECT-04-0818,教技函[2005]35号)
关键词 企业集团 高管人员 股权激励 母子公司 business groups top managers ownership motivation headquarters and subsidiaries
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参考文献19

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二级参考文献59

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