第一密封价格逆向拍卖机制博弈研究

A Game Study of the First-price Sealed-bid Procurement Auction

在供应商对拟投标项目成本估计独立、不同分布的条件下,通过建立不公开保留价的第一价格逆向拍卖机制博弈模型,推导了供应商的最优报价策略,博弈均衡存在时采购者最优保留价满足的条件,发现供应商的报价高于他的成本估计,进一步得到了与该采购机制资源配置效率有关的结论:参与投标的人数越多供应商报价溢出成本部分越少;成本越低的供应商期望支付越大.这对于现实采购拍卖的政策建议为:设法让更多供应商参与竞标,能有效选择优势供应商、降低采购成本、增加社会福利.

Under the suppliers＇ valuation of the object＇s projects is independent of others, and it is differential distribution, establish a game model of the first price sealed-bid reverse auction scheme which is incentive comparative. Studying the strategy of supplier, finding the proposition of the relationship between the number of suppliers and the strategy of bidding, developed the conclusion about the expected payoffs of the suppliers. Under the incentive comparative condition, the optimal reserve of the auctioneer is found.