期刊文献+

团队生产中的博弈模型与道德风险研究 被引量:4

Research on Game Model and Moral Hazard of Teamwork
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摘要 首先根据团队生产在产出函数的特点,建立了由二人组成的团队生产模型;接着,在分析了团队生产的博弈过程后,求得团队成员努力投入的N ash均衡;最后,着重研究了两种证实团队生产中存在道德风险的方法. The paper models two-person team according to the teamwork's character. Then after researching game relation of teamwork, the Nash equilibrium of team members' effort input is worked out. Finally the paper focuses on two ways of confirming moral hazard existed in teamwork.
作者 黄国华 周云
出处 《数学的实践与认识》 CSCD 北大核心 2009年第6期71-76,共6页 Mathematics in Practice and Theory
关键词 团队生产 道德风险 博弈 teamwork game moral hazard
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参考文献8

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同被引文献18

  • 1苏新有.浅析人民公社时期的农民个人收入分配制度[J].安阳师范学院学报,2006(4):56-58. 被引量:2
  • 2魏光兴,余乐安,汪寿阳,黎建强.基于协同效应的团队合作激励因素研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007,27(1):1-9. 被引量:38
  • 3张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2003..
  • 4HOLMSTROM B. Moral hazard in teams [ J]. The Bell Journal of Economics, 1982, 13 ( 2 ) :324 - 340.
  • 5MCAFEE R P, MCMILLAN J. Optimal contracts for teams [ J]. International Economic Review, 1991, 32 (3) :561 - 577.
  • 6ENGLMAIER F, WAMBACH A. Optimal incentive contracts un- der inequity aversion [ J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, 69:312 - 328.
  • 7BARTLING B, SIEMENS F A V. The intensity of incentives in firms and markets: Moral hazard with envious agents [ J ]. Labour Economics, 2010, 17:598 - 607.
  • 8SINGER M, DONOSO P, SICKERT C R. A static model of coop- eration for group-based incentive plans [ J]. Int. J. Production E- conomics, 2008, 115:492--501.
  • 9FRANCO A M, MITCHEL L, VERESHCHAGINA G. Incentives and the structure of teams [ J ]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, 146:2307 - 2332.
  • 10B. Holmstrom. Moral hazard in teams[J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1982,13: 324-340.

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