人才激励约束合同设计中的最优决策研究

Incentive Constraint Contract Design for Optimizing Principal

改进了传统人才激励约束合同设计中的主体风险中性的假定,提出了在主体风险规避假定下委托-代理合同的修改结果.通过将其他企业利润、经营者抵押权益等因素引入委托-代理合同,建立了有效的重复博弈长期激励机制.

This paper improves traditional incentive constraint contract,in which assumed principal was always risk neutral,and gives an amended result of principal-agent contract on condition that principal is risk avoidable.At the same time,profit of other corporations and security interest are also introduced into principal-agent contract.In this way,an effective mechanism is established by recurring game and long-term incentive.