摘要
基于完全信息静态模型,研究了竞争市场上的两厂商在线性需求函数和线性成本函数条件下的三度价格歧视的有效性问题,并分别给出了两厂商在两个子市场上,在单一价格条件下以及歧视价格条件下的最优销售量、最优价格和最大利润的计算公式,及各厂商价格歧视有效和价格歧视无异于单一价格的充要条件.
Based on a complete static information model,the linear demand functions,and linear cost functions,the paper studies the effectivity of third-degree price discrimination under two manufacturers.The calculation formulas of the maximum sales volume and the maximum price and the maximum profit which belong to both manufacturers who is on the condition of common price or third-degree price discrimination in the two sub-markets,and also put forward the necessary and sufficient conditions for third-degree price discrimination to be effective or to be same as common price.
出处
《电子科技大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2007年第S1期482-484,共3页
Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
关键词
有效性
完全信息静态博弈
线性成本
线性需求
三度价格歧视
effectivity
gamble on complete static information
linear cost
linear demand
thirddegree price discrimination