Coordinating pricing strategies in supply chain under asymmetric information and disruptions

应急环境和非对称信息下供应链协调价格策略(英文)

The coordinating pricing strategies with asymmetric cost information under disruptions are investigated in a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain system.While the retailer's cost structure is asymmetric information,supply chain pricing contract models(a wholesale price contract and an all-unit quantity discount contract)under asymmetric information are proposed by employing the principal-agent principle in a regular scenario.When the retailer's cost distribution is fluctuated by disruptions,we obtain the optimal emergency strategies of the supply chain under asymmetric information by considering deviation costs and show how to effectively handle the cost uncertainty.Using numerical methods,impacts of cost disruptions on the optimal wholesale price,the retailer price,the order quantity and the expected profits of the retailer,the supplier,as well as the total system are analyzed.It is found that the all-unit quantity discount policy can obtain better performance than the wholesale pricing policy.

研究了应急环境和不对称信息下包含一个供应商和一个零售商的供应链系统协调价格策略.当零售商成本信息为非对称信息时,利用委托代理原理设计了非对称信息下2种供应链价格契约(批发价契约和全部数量折扣契约)模型.当突发事件造成零售商的成本分布变化时,为了有效应对成本不确定性,考虑附加偏差成本,给出了上述2种价格契约在应急环境下的最优应对决策.利用数值模型分析了成本扰动对批发价、零售价、订单数量,以及零售商、供应商和系统期望利润的影响.研究显示,数量折扣契约比批发价契约更能有效地提高供应链绩效.