利益扩张型虚假城市化现象的激励机制探析:一个基于序贯博弈的分析框架

Analysis on Incentive Mechanism of Interests Expansion Fake Urbanization Phenomenon:An Analytical Framework Based on Extensive Game Theory Perspective

在国家实施城市化战略的进程中,地方政府以推进城市化为名,利用现有市制制度与相关政策的缺陷,有选择地进行掠夺性征地,将获取土地增值的收益作为基本目标,逃避提供公共服务的职责,致使名义上实现城市化的农民,未能获取城市化的应有收益,难以获得城市居民对等的公共服务,造成城市化水平虚假提高。由于其间政府与民众的行为具有强烈的利益扩张冲动,概称之为利益扩张型虚假城市化现象;它突出表现为在城市的建成区内,存在着大量的农村建制区域。这种社会现象背后潜存着稳定的制度结构与激励机制。本文以博弈分析为视角,具体阐释了利益扩张型虚假城市化现象的生成机制。

During the process of urbanization strategy implementing,in order to seize the profit of land increments,the local government official make full use of the shortcoming of urbanization mechanism and correlative policy, confiscate the peasant lands with ferociously,evade the responsibility of sup- plying public services.Therefore,the peasants can't get the benefits of urban- ization and the public services,so the level of urbanization has improved osten- sibly.We called the phenomenon as interests expansion fake urbanization,the reason is the behaviors of the local government and the peasants with the im- pulsion to expand interests; there are a lot of rural administration regions in the city,which is the most prominent sign of this phenomenon.There are sta- ble latent institution structure and incentive mechanism behind the phenome- non.This study employs the game theory to cast light on the mechanism of in- terests expansion ostensible urbanization in detail.