我国基金会内部治理问题的博弈分析

Game Analysis on the Internal Corporate Governance of Foundations in China

基于内部利益相关者角度,基金会内部治理问题主要是如何处理好监事会与理事会的内部监督关系,以及理事会与内部办事机构的委托—代理关系。通过引入博弈论分析得出:加大对理事会失职的惩罚,对尽职的理事会和监事会皆给予一定的隐性声誉激励,有利于实现双方的混合战略纳什均衡。对内部工作人员,一方面要促进其提高工作效率;另一方面要采用效率工资并适当提高绩效奖金的显性激励与约束机制。

Based on the perspective of internal stakeholders, the purpose of the internal corporate governance of foundations is how to properly deal with the internal oversight relationship between the board of council and the board of supervisor, as well as the principal-agent relationship between the board of council and the internal offices. By introducing game theory, it is analyzed that, to increase the penalties for dereliction of the board of council, as well as to give a certain reputation of hidden incentive for fidelity of the board of council and the board of supervisors, the two sides are conducive to realization of the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium. But for the internal staff, on the one hand foundations need to improve their work efficiency, on the other hand, dominant incentive and restrictive mechanism should be adopted, such as by offering efficiency-based wages and performance bonuses.