我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗?

Is Top Management Compensation of Chinese Public Companies Sticky?

本文选取2001—2007年上市公司作为样本,首先从薪酬-业绩敏感性角度更全面地考察了我国上市公司高管薪酬机制的效果,随后进一步研究我国上市公司高管薪酬的粘性特征以及影响因素。实证研究表明,随着薪酬制度改革的深入,我国上市公司高管的薪酬已经呈现显著的业绩敏感性,但是,高管薪酬的业绩敏感性存在不对称的特征,业绩上升时薪酬的增加幅度显著高于业绩下降时薪酬的减少幅度,即存在粘性特征;而同为公司员工的普通员工其薪酬是否存在粘性并没有稳定的一致结论。同时,研究发现,民营企业和中央政府控制的企业具有更少的高管薪酬粘性,董事会独立性的增强也有助于降低薪酬粘性,这一定程度上说明了我国独立董事制度的有效性。

This article studies sensitivity of top management compensation - performance in China more completely and timely using 2001- 2007 data, and examines the stickiness of top management compensation for the first time. We found that our top management compensation has been correlated with performance during the development of remuneration reform and the compensation been sticky. And, we found that the stickiness of top management compensation was less in private and central government controlled companies compared to local government controlled companies, and the independence of board would weaken the stickiness of top management compensation.