从委托-代理理论谈我国国有企业的激励与监管

Incentives and Supervision of China＇ s State - owned Business by Principal- agent Theory

从委托代理理论的介绍入手，结合我国目前国有企业改制过程中的激励与监管中存在的问题，分析出解决我国国有上市公司治理问题的途径。激励方面可以考虑建立企业家市场，建立健全对国有企业主要经营者近期激励机制、以产权为目标的远期激励机制和精神激励机制；监管方面可以考虑建立约束机制。

From the principal- agent theory＇s introduction, binding the problems existing in incentives and supervision in the process of China＇s present state -owned business reform, This article obtains the method to solve problems in state -owned listed companies. As for incentives, the entrepreneur market may be considered, the near incentive system for main operators of state - owned business and forward incentive system and the spirit incentive system the property right as the goal should be established. As supervision, restraint system may be considered taking