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基于多个大股东博弈的最优股权结构分析 被引量:2

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摘要 大股东之间的利益冲突已是公司治理研究中的热点问题,本文通过构建不完全信息动态博弈模型,重点研究了大股东之间的博弈对公司价值的影响。结果表明,大股东成员持股比例比较接近,达到混合策略纳什均衡时,能减小寻求获得控制权私人收益的动机,可以避免一股独大,有利于上市公司的治理。
作者 章新蓉 杨璐
机构地区 重庆工商大学
出处 《上海经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第4期73-76,共4页 Shanghai Journal of Economics
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