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所有者角度的财务报告目标 被引量:1

An Owner’s Perspective of Financial Reporting Objectives
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摘要 依据代理理论,只要存在所有权和经营权的分离,并且在所有者无法完全观察到代理人行动的情况下,财务报告就承担了受托责任目标。对于上市公司来说,虚拟资本的投机本性导致对财务报告的信息需求包含对资源配置决策有用的信息和受托责任信息。因此,对于上市公司的投资者来说,财务报告的目标应当同时包含资源配置决策有用目标和受托责任目标。资源配置决策有用目标和受托责任目标作为两个相互独立的目标,与之对应的财务报告信息集合不一定相互一致。 According to the agency theory, as long as the ownership and the management right are separated,and the owner cannot fully observe the agent's action, financial reporting will assume the fiduciary duty objectives. As for the listed companies, the speculative nature of fictitious capital requires that the information demanded by the financial reporting should include both the information useful for resource allocation decisions and the information useful for fiduciary duties. Therefore, as for the investors of listed companies, the objectives of financial reporting should include both the objective useful for resource allocation decisions and the objective of fiduciary duties. Since the objective Useful for resource allocation decisions and the objective of fiduciary duties are two independent objectives, the corresponding information gathered for the financial reporting is not necessarily consistent with each other.
作者 孙丽影
机构地区 厦门大学会计系
出处 《当代财经》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第4期108-112,共5页 Contemporary Finance and Economics
基金 国家社科基金(07CJY010 06BJY018)
关键词 财务报告目标 代理理论 虚拟资本 financial reporting objectives agency theory fictitious capital
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