股权流动性与债权人利益保护

Equity Mobility and Protection of Creditors’Interest

本文研究股权流动性对股东-债权人冲突引起的投资不足的影响,并以此为出发点讨论债权人利益保护问题。经实证研究表明,由于流通股股东与非流通股股东目标的差异,股权流动性越低的企业越容易发生股东-债权人冲突引起的投资不足行为,也就是说,股东对债权人利益的侵害越严重。相对于上市公司,非上市公司的股权流动性较差,这就使得非上市公司债权人利益更容易受到侵害。

This paper is a study of the influence of equity mobility on underinvestment resulted from shareholder-creditor conflict. Then, it further discusses the problem of protection of creditor＇s interest. The empirical study shows that due to the different objectives of the share-holders of negotiable and non-negotiable shares, there are more underinvestment behaviors resulted fi＇om shareholder-creditor conflicts in the enterprises with lower equity mobility, i.e. more serious violations on the creditor＇s interest by shareholders. Compared with those listed companies, the equity mobility in non-listed companies is poor; this makes the creditor＇s interests of the non-listed companies more vulnerable to be violated.