自由现金流量、股权结构与我国上市公司过度投资问题研究

A Study of Free Cash Flow, Ownership Structure and Over- investment of China’s Listed Companies

按照自由现金流量假说,当公司存在大量自由现金流量时,管理人员的机会主义行为容易引发过度投资。本文以2005-2007年上市公司数据考察我国企业是否存在过度投资以及股权结构能否抑制过度投资。分析表明我国企业普遍存在过度投资行为,国有企业相比非国有企业过度投资更严重,现金流与投资行为显著正相关,第一大股东持股比例与股权集中度在某种程度上能够制约过度投资,但是举债在我国并不能对过度投资发挥有效的抑制作用。

According to the hypothesis of free cash flow, when a company owns lots of free cash flow, the opportunistic behavior of the managerial personnel will easily lead to over-investment. By using the data of the listed companies from 2005 to 2007, this paper tries to find out whether there exists over-investment in the enterprises of China and whether the ownership structure can restrain the over-investment. The results indicate that over-investment is widely existed in China＇ s listed companies. Compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the problem of over-investment is more serious in the state-owned enterprises. The relationship between cash flow and investment is obviously a positive correlation. The share proportion of the first major shareholder and the ownership concentration can restrict over-investment to a certain degree, but in China carrying debt cannot play an effective role to restrict over-investment.