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“镶嵌”于网络的建筑企业信誉机制探讨

On Construction Enterprise Credit Mechanism Embedded in Social Network
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摘要 依据格兰诺维特的"镶嵌"理论,建筑企业镶嵌于社会关系网络,建筑企业信誉机制的探讨应当以行业为背景,以企业间的动态博弈为研究对象。通过分析得出,建筑企业间的长期合作将对信誉产生促进作用。通过进一步对长期合作信誉机制的模型验证,得到结论:在以长远收益为目标的建筑企业博弈过程中,博弈双方都成为高信誉度的企业是惟一可行的Nash均衡结果,因此,致力于营造长期合作的行业氛围是有效建立信誉机制的关键。 According to Granovetter's Embeddedness Theory, construction industry embedded in social network. Thus, discussion about construction enterprise credit mechanism should be put in industry background, through dynamic game among enterprises. By analysis, credit mechanism could be put forward by long-run cooperation among enterprises. With a forward model improvement of long-run cooperation credit mechanism, writer draws a conclusion which is with a long-run income target, enterprises should be high-credit, which is an only reasonable Nash equilibrium. Therefore, to try to establish cooperative industry environment is a key factor to credit mechanism.
出处 《工程建设与设计》 2009年第3期122-125,共4页 Construction & Design for Engineering
关键词 信誉 镶嵌 博弈 credit embeddedness game
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参考文献7

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