塞尔的社会本体论——为什么从区分制度事实和原始事实开始?

Why does Searle’s Social Ontology Begin With the Distinction between Institutional Facts and Brute Facts?

本文从哲学史上关于"事实"的定义的争论出发,推测塞尔的社会本体论从区分制度事实和原始事实开始的原因。塞尔对二者的区分,对于解决话语分析家的困惑有什么帮助呢?对科学事实的建构论有什么影响呢?本文将一一探讨。

This paper starts from the argument of the definition of fact in the history of philosophy, and then infers the reason for Searle’s social ontology begins with the distinction between institutional facts and brute facts. Is it helpful for resolving the bewilderment of the discourse analysts? Does it impose any influence on the construction theory of scientific facts? Here I would like to make some discussion.