国有产权、公司治理与非效率投资

State-Ownership,Corporate and Investment Inefficiency

投资是上市公司最重要的财务决策,投资过度或者不足都有损公司价值实现。我国国有上市公司存在着股东与经理层、大股东与中小股东的两类代理问题,国有股东又具有特殊的产权属性和利益目标,这些都直接影响国有上市公司的非效率投资。借助投资过度的识别模型和Logistic回归,基于国有上市公司2004～2006年的证据研究显示,国有上市公司存在因经理层代理问题和政府干预导致的投资过度,也存在因私人收益动机下的隧道挖掘导致的投资不足,中小股东未能有效发挥对国有控股股东的制衡作用。政府部门控制公司比国有法人控制公司,地方控制公司较中央控制公司更可能发生过度投资。

Investment is the most important financial decision in listed companies. Over-investment and under-investment both disturb the realization of corporate valuation. For the Chinese state-owned listed companies, there exist agency problems between shareholders and management, and between large shareholders and middle and small shareholders. Stateowned shareholders have specific property rights and private benefits. All these directly affect the inefficient investment decisions of state-owned listed companies. After judging over-investment using a model and making logistic regression, empirical research results are that in state-owned listed companies, agency problems between shareholders and management and government interference cause over- investment, and tunneling for private benefits causes under-investment. Middle and small shareholders don＇ t show balancing impact on state-owned controlling shareholders. Over-investment is more possible in listed companies controlled by government than by listed companies controlled by state-owned corporation, and also in listed companies controlled by local government than in listed companies controlled by central government.