经济发展、社会福利与治理结构

Economic Development,Social Welfare and Governance Structure

本文试图为政治治理结构选择提供一个经济学解释。地方政府拥有资源的配置权,利益集团为了获得这项资源配置而去俘获地方政府,但这会造成社会收入不均加剧,从而给政府带来社会收入不均成本。中央政府可以通过任命制、有限选举制以及选举制三种不同的政治治理结构来规制地方政府的资源配置行为,从而最大化自身的利益。本文分析表明,在不同的环境下中央政府会选择不同的最优政治治理结构。从社会福利的角度看,此制度结构下政府的选择行为不一定是社会福利最优的。社会收入差距越大、政府对于私人收益的评价越低,政府越有可能接受社会的问责。

We develop an economic theory of political transitions. Local governments can decide how to allocate resource, so some interest groups may want to capture local governments to acquire the resource, which will increase the inequality of social revenue and bring governments some cost such as unrest. Centre government can regulate the decision behavior of local government through three political institutes, i.e. Appointment, Limited Election and Election to maximize his benefit in different economic environments. Furthermore, governments＇ choices may not be optimal in some situations. The greater the social income gap and the lower Government valuing private income, the more likely that governments accept accountability from civilians.