项目管理中业主-承包商最优激励模型研究

Research on Optimal Incentive Model between Owner and Contractor in Project Management

为解决项目管理中承包商不努力工作的问题,运用信息经济学中的委托代理理论,建立了业主一承包商间的激励数学模型.构造了努力产出函数和努力成本函数,求出了业主的最优激励水平以及相应的承包商最优努力水平,给出了业主的最优激励合同安排.最后,通过一个简化算例求出了模型均衡解的解析式,结果表明模型的结论是符合工程项目实际的,从而本模型能够为业主的激励合同设计提供指导.

To solve the problem that the contractor does not make efforts in project management, a mathematical incentive model between owner and contractor is established by using principal-agent theory in Information Economics. By constructing production function and cost function of the contractor＇s efforts, the owner＇s optimal incentive level and the contractor＇s optimal efforts level are solved, and the ownerrs optimal incentive contract arrangement is given. Finally, the analytical formula of equilibrium root of the model is solved by a simplified numerical example, and the results indicate that the conclusions of the model accord with the practice of project, so this model can provide guidance for the owner to design the incentive contract.