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中国产品质量监管的声誉模型分析 被引量:9

A Reputation Model Analysis on the Supervision of Product Quality in China
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摘要 当前中国商品市场上假冒伪劣现象严重,损害消费者权益的事件层出不穷。在两阶段声誉模型中,消费者运用贝叶斯法则推断企业诚信状况并决定下期的购买行为,此时声誉力量可以约束企业的投机主义倾向,将造假企业驱逐出市场。而对重点行业加强监管、加大处罚力度、鼓励消费者投诉,可以促进市场净化,加快诚信社会的建设步伐。 There are too many shoddy products filling Chinese commodity markets, which seriously damaged the interests of consumers. In the reputation model, consumers use Bayesian law to judge the integrity of corporations, and decide the purchase behavior of next phase. As the result reputation can serve as a power to restraint opportunism of firms, driving the counterfeiting firm out the market. Enforcing the regulation on key industries, increasing the penalties and encouraging consumers to complaint can quicken the building of honesty society.
出处 《经济与管理》 2009年第4期29-31,共3页 Economy and Management
关键词 产品质量 声誉模型 博弈 监管 product quality reputation game theory supervision
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