基于委托代理模型的股权激励与企业价值的博弈分析

Game Theory of Stock Option Incentive and Corporate Value on the Basis of Pricipal-agent Model

由于作为委托人的企业所有者不能观测到代理人即员工的行动,只能观测到产出,所以企业所有者需要以观察到的产出水平对员工进行奖励,本文通过以股权激励为基础的博弈分析研究企业制定员工工资合同时应该采用的激励程度。

Since employer cannot watch the employee＇s action except the products, he has to reward the employee by product. This paper will analyse the incentive level in making the employee＇s salary by a game theory on the basis of pricipal - agent model.