风险投资中双重道德风险的多阶段博弈分析

Analysis on Multi-stage Investment Game of Double Moral Hazard in Venture Capital

目前风险投资中的道德风险研究热点主要集中于企业家方,但忽视了风险投资家方也存在着道德风险。本文利用多阶段动态博弈模型考察了风险投资家与企业家之间的双重道德风险问题。通过对Ramy Elitzur模型的改进,推导出风险投资家与企业家之间的最优激励报酬合同,分析影响合同设计的诸多因素,并得出风险投资家的最佳退出点,有效地弥补了原有模型的局限之处,对于我国的风险投资实践也具有一定的指导意义。

Current studies on moral hazard in venture capital mainly focus on the entrepreneurs, but ignore that moral hazard also show itself for venture capitalists. This study analyzes double moral hazard problem between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs using multi-stage dynamic game theoretic model. Based on improving Ramy Elitzur Model, the contribution of this paper lies in the insights it provides optimal incentive contract, some factors affecting the contract design and an optimal exit point, which will effectively make up the deficiencies of the original model and make sense for the venture capital practice in China.