摘要
应用进化博弈理论分析供应链网络中节点企业之间的合作策略学习过程,基于博弈参与方有限理性的假设前提,针对两人对称和两人非对称合作两种情况,分析模仿者复制动态模型和相应的进化稳定策略,证明当信任约束机制不健全时,节点企业最终均会选择不合作,而当信任约束机制健全时,节点企业最终均会选择合作。
Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality and the help of the basic framework of evolutionary game theory, different replicate dynamics models are analyzed in symmetric or asymmetric co-opetition games, as well as its evolutionarily stable strategy is studied. We prove that when the trust and restriction mechanism is perfect, node enterprises will choose cooperation mode, otherwise, they＇ 11 choose a non-cooperation way.
出处
《湖南工业大学学报》
2009年第2期77-81,共5页
Journal of Hunan University of Technology
基金
湖南省自然科学基金资助项目(05JJ40109)
湖南工业大学研究生创新基金资助项目(CX0819)
关键词
供应链网络
合作
进化博弈
进化稳定策略
supply chain network
cooperation
evolutionary game
evolutionarily stable strategy
