转型经济中的战略剥离分析:以中国上市企业为例

Corporate Divestitures in Emerging Economies:Research on Chinese Listed Firms

随着转型经济中企业并购与重组活动的日益增多,理论界和实业界都期望有适合转型经济的理论来指导企业的重组行为。为此,本文以战略反馈和代理理论为理论基础,探讨以中国为代表的转型经济中企业战略剥离的动因。通过对1999-2003年中国上市企业剥离行为的分析,本文发现中国上市企业的剥离行为主要出于战略考虑,包括并购后整合的需要、过度多元化调整的需要以及绩效改进的需要;传统的代理理论则缺乏解释力度。这一结果表明,中国企业已经能够根据战略需要来进行业务重组,同时也呼吁政府和业界加强公司治理,以充分发挥公司治理的作用。

With the rise of acquisitions and restructuring activity in emerging economies （such as China）, both theoretical researchers and practitioners are anticipating the emergence of appropriate theories to guide such activities in relation to transitional economies. This study addressed this gap by examining the determinants of corporate divestiture intensity in China, In particular, we compare the explanatory power of two theoretical frameworks - the strategic response perspective and agency theory. The strategic response perspective assumes that divestiture is a remedy for previous strategic actions. Based on the previous literature, we identify three factors - acquisition intensity, diversification, and firm performance - that may influence a firm＇s decision to divest a unit. We hypothesize that acquisition intensity and diversification would have positive effects on corporate divestiture, while firm performance would have a negative relationship with corporate divestiture. Agency theory argues that divestiture is an outcome of improved corporate gover- nance. This study identified three factors that are related to corporate governance： ownership concentration, CEO duality, and outside director ratio. We hypothesized that ownership concentration would have a positive effect on corporate divestiture, while CEO duality and the outside director ratio would have negative effects. These hypotheses were tested from a sample of Chinese publicly listed firms taken between 1999 and 2003. This time period was chosen because corporate restructuring activity became common during this span, and public firms have also disclosed detailed divestiture information relating to this period. Our findings showed that Chinese listed companies were more likely to initiate divestiture activities to address strategic problems including post-acquisition integration, over-diversification, and poor performance. The dominating agency argument common in developed economies received little empirical support in a Chinese context. These results indicate that Chinese firms conduct business restructuring to satisfy their strategic needs. In addition, both governments and practitioners should strengthen corporate governance among Chinese listed firms.