公司治理强度、审计力度与审计质量

Corporate Governance Strength,Audit Effort and Audit Quality

自安然事件以来,公司治理和外部审计的重要性得到了前所未有的重视。本文构建了一个公司所有者与外部审计师之间的博弈理论模型,以分析均衡状态下公司治理强度、审计力度与审计质量之间的关系,并讨论所有者和审计师赔偿责任对博弈均衡的影响。我们特别引入了公司治理成本函数和审计成本函数,并同时考虑了公司所有者和审计师的赔偿责任。在本模型中,公司所有者对公司治理强度的决策和外部审计师对审计力度的决策共同影响审计报告对外部投资者的信息有用性(即审计质量),并最终影响了公司的成交价格。研究得到的主要结论是:(1)均衡状态下公司治理强度的增加有助于提升审计力度和审计质量;(2)所有者赔偿责任的增加只会提高公司成交价格,但不会影响博弈均衡和均衡状态下的审计质量;(3)审计师赔偿责任的增加并不一定导致所有者降低公司治理强度,且只有在特定情况下才能提升审计力度和审计质量。

The importance of corporate governance and external audits has been repeatedly emphasized worldwide since the exposure of the Enron scandal in 2002. With reference particularly to research published by Pae and Yoo in 2001, this paper constructs a game theoretical model primarily featuring a firm＇s owner （who intends to sell a solely held firm） and an external auditor （who is hired by the owner to issue an audit report）. We further introduce into the model cost functions for corporate governance strength and audit effort, and the legal liabilities of the owner and auditor. In our model, the relationship between corporate governance strength, audit effort and audit quality are analyzed systematically. Furthermore, we also analyze the potential effects of the legal liabilities of the owner and auditor on equilibrium corporate governance strength, audit effort and audit quality. The owner＇s decision on corporate governance strength and the auditor＇s decision on audit effort in our model will jointly influence the informativeness and quality of the auditor＇s report to external investors, and ultimately influence the market value of the firm. Our main results include： （1） in equilibrium, an increase in corporate governance strength may encourage the auditor to enhance audit effort and consequently result in a higher level of audit quality; （2） an increase in the owner＇s legal liability has no effect on the game equilibrium and audit quality even though it may increase the market value of the firm; （3） an increase in the auditor＇s legal liability may not necessarily decrease corporate governance strength, and can enhance the audit effort and audit quality only when some particular restrictions have been imposed on it. Additionally, the robustness of the results under different situations is discussed in relation to non-audit fees, auditor independence, and other alternative assumptions. Finally, conclusions and potential policy implications are provided.