现象概念与物理主义

Phenomenal Concepts and Physicalism

现象概念策略是目前心灵哲学中支持和捍卫物理主义的最有影响的论证之一。它提倡一种现象特性与物理特性之间的本体一元论,并且以一种对现象概念的阐述来化解主要的反物理主义论证。国外对现象概念策略的最新批评试图展示,即便现象特性与物理特性是同一的,现象概念策略也不能以此来成功地化解像可想象性论证以及解释空缺论证这样的主要的反物理主义论证。但是,这些批评意见都没有抓住现象概念策略的真正弱点。现象概念策略所面临的实质问题在于它不能证明作为其基础的特性层面上的本体一元论,关于这个问题的争论目前已经达到探究心灵特性的现象层面是否具有隐藏的物理本质的深度。对现象概念策略的进一步研究要求我们思考一些涉及本体论、模态论以及语义学方面的更深入的哲学问题。

Phenomenal concept strategy is presently one of the most influential arguments that support and defend physicalism in the philosophy of mind. It advocates a version of ontological monism concerning phenomenal properties and physical properties, and it provides an account of phenomenal concepts and uses that to explain away the major anti-physicalist arguments. The recently overseas criticisms of phenomenal concept strategy attempt to show that even if phenomenal properties are identical with physical properties, phenomenal concept strategy cannot use this to successfully explain away major anti-physicalist arguments such as the conceivability argument and the explanatory gap argument. But all these criticisms miss the real weakness of phenomenal concept strategy. The real problem faced by phenomenal concept strategy is that the strategy itself cannot prove the ontological monism with regard to properties, which is a fundamental thesis of the strategy. The debate concerning this problem has currently reached the depth of investigating whether there exists hidden physical essence of the phenomenal aspect of a mental property. Further studies of phenomenal concept strategy will demand us to think about certain deeper philosophical issues concerning ontology, modality, and semantics.