摘要
Research suggests that transient institutions, i.e., institutions with short-term investment horizon,make management focus on short-term earnings goals. This study examines incentive in terms of CEO cash compensation that explains why management concentrates on short-term earnings results when transient institutions hold high levels of ownership. Using quarterly consensus analysts＇ expectations as a proxy for short-term earnings benchmarks, the author finds that CEO cash compensation and the frequency with which management misses quarterly earnings benchmarks in a year （MISSNUMt） are more strongly negatively associated in firms with high transient institutional ownership than in firms with low transient institutional ownership, suggesting that transient institutions strengthen the inverse relation between CEO cash pay and missing short-term earnings benchmarks and hence increase pressure on management in terms of cash pay for short-term results. Moreover, the author shows that change in CEO cash compensation is positively associated with change in transient institutional ownership, consistent with the idea that selling shares by transient institutions influences the boards of portfolio firms in CEO cash compensation decision. This study contributes to the governance literature and is relevant to business managers by providing additional evidence that transient institutions provide less patient capital and may not benefit long-run firm value creation.
