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西方三权分立制度约束下贸易政策的生成机理——一个理论模型及其政策含义 被引量:1

The Generating Mechanism for the Trade Policy under the Political System of Separation of the Three Powers: A Theoretical Model and its Policy Implications
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摘要 贸易政策是一种特殊的公共产品。在西方三权分立的西方政治架构制约下,一国贸易政策的形成和决定过程受国家核心利益、行业利益集团以及贸易对手策略等因素的制约和影响。其中,国家核心利益决定贸易政策基本性质和属性,而行业利益集团对贸易政策的偏向产生明显影响,从而导致贸易政策在一定程度上偏离福利目标。另外,贸易对手的策略性行为对一国贸易政策的制定具有重要的牵制作用。 Trade policy is a special type of public goods. During the process of its formulation, a country's trade policy is simultaneously affected by three elements-namely, the national interests, the interest groups, and the strategic action from its trade partner under the political system of Separation of the Three Powers. The model shows that the national interests have a decisive effect on the trade policy while the interest groups project an obvious influence on the policy. On the other hand, the existence of the strategic action from its trade partner helps to curb the trade policy of the country.
作者 梁碧波
出处 《国际经贸探索》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第4期4-8,29,共6页 International Economics and Trade Research
基金 广东省普通高校人文社科规划研究项目重点课题(06ZD79003)
关键词 贸易政策 生成机理 决定因素 政策含义 trade policy generating mechanism determinant policy implication
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