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道路车辆不良汇入驾驶行为的模型构建 被引量:1

Modeling of Risky Automobile Merging Behavior
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摘要 针对当前国内关于不良汇入驾驶行为模型研究的空白,从概率统计和博弈论角度量化分析该行为。基于哈尔滨市高峰和平峰时段的定点视频调查数据,分析了汽车不良汇入驾驶行为的基本统计特性,给出了累计频率分布模型。研究结果表明当临界汇入间隙时间不足4 s时,车辆汇入行为可界定为不良行为。进而,引入双人混合战略模型,从纳什均衡角度分析了支路汇入主路不良行为的发生概率。 With regard to the vacuum of the research on the model of the risky automobile merging behavior, the behavior was analyzed quantitatively by probability statistics and game theory. Based on the site video data during peak period and peace period in Harbin, the basic statistics characteristics of the risky merging behavior of cars were analyzed, and the cumulative frequency distribution model was constructed. The result shows that the merging behavior can be regarded as acts of misconduct, if the merging time was less than the critical gap by 4s. Further more, the hybrid strategy model of two players was introduced, and the occurrence probability of the risk merging behavior was proposed by Nash Equilibrium when the vehicle was merged from the branch road to the main road.
机构地区 哈尔滨工业大学
出处 《交通信息与安全》 2009年第2期29-31,共3页 Journal of Transport Information and Safety
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:50778056)资助
关键词 不良汇入驾驶行为 视频调查 概率模型 临界汇入间隙 博弈理论 risky merging behavior video survey probability model critical gap of merging game theory
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