收购方经理人代理问题的企业特征分析——基于中国上市公司并购活动的经验研究

Agent Problem and Acquiring Firm Characteristics:Evidence From Acquisitions Among the Listed Companies in China

国内外大量的实证研究表明,经理人的代理问题是收购企业价值减损的重要原因之一。问题在于,什么样的收购企业会承担更大的代理风险?通过研究中国上市公司发生于2001—2005年共301家收购企业在并购前后企业特征与企业价值的关系,对并购活动中经理人代理问题的影响因素进行了实证检验。发现,凡是容易引发代理问题的收购企业在并购前一般具有如下特征:较高的自由现金流量、大型的企业规模以及国有控股的企业性质。而在并购前企业高的负债水平、经理人对本企业的高持股比例以及良好的经营管理水平有助于减少并购中的代理问题,从而提高并购后企业的价值。本文为企业外部投资者监督、控制经理人不合理的并购决策,提供了有意义的参考与借鉴。

Evidence shows that the agent problem is the main cause of value destruction to acquiring finns. The question is ：What kind of acquiring firm will more easily trigger the principalagent problem ？ Through the empirical study of the data set form 301 acquisitions which happened among the Listed Companies in China form 2001 to 2005,We find that：Pre-Free cash flow, Size and Company Type are negative with Post-Value of acquiring firms ;Pre-Leverage ,Manager Ownership and Managerial Expertise are positive with Post-Value of acquiring firms. The study provides outsiders a meaningful reference of monitoring and controlling irrational acquisitions.