股权集中下的控股股东侵占与投资者保护综述

A Survey of Controlling Shareholders' Expropriation and Investor Protection under Concentrated Ownership Structuve

本文针对股权集中的市场环境下,围绕"股权集中现象及形成——代理问题与控股股东侵占——投资者法律保护"这一主线,对这一领域公司治理的最新理论和实证研究进行了系统性回顾。本文在回顾中发现,股权集中是除英、美之外世界各地普遍存在的现象,且控股股东通过交叉持股、持有不同投票权股票及金字塔结构等方式实现控制权和现金流权分离,股权集中的原因是缺乏有效法律保护。股权集中导致控股股东利用控制权侵占外部投资者利益,在两权分离市场中侵占现象更为明显。法律制度是抑制控股股东侵占、保护中小投资者利益的最好方式。在回顾的基础上,本文进一步指出了这一领域可行的研究方向。

This paper reviews the literature on corporate governance issues under concentrated ownership structure, focusing on phenomena and generation of concentrated ownership structure, agency problem and controlling shareholders＇ expropriation, investor protection. It finds out the concentrated ownership structure is popular except in US and UK. And Control right and Cash flow right is separated by controlling shareholders through crossing-holding, dual class shares and pyramidal ownership structure. The generation of concentrated ownership is due to the lack of effective legal protection. Furthermore, the concentration of ownership results in agency problem between controlling shareholder and outside investor. Legal system is the best way to constrain controlling shareholders＇ expropriation and protect outside investors. In addition, it points out potential research directions in this area.