摘要
我国偏远山区的农村供水只能作为一种公共产品由政府来提供。本文以委托—代理理论为工具,结合实例,分析了农村水利工程经营权的代理人的选择问题。本文的结论是由于能够明晰产权、弱化信息不对称问题、减少委托—代理层次,选择县农村供水协会作为集体产权的最终代理人是有效率的产权安排形式。本文的结论可以推广到涉及公共品的其他领域。
Water supply in remote mountain areas of our country,as a kind of public goods,can only be provided by the government.The authors of this article,adopting principal-agent theory and combining the specific example,analyze the agent choice for the managerial rights of rural hydraulic project.The conclusion is as the following: to choose rural water supply association of the country as the agent of the collective property is an effective form of property arrangement,as it may clarify ownership,weaken information unbalance,and reduce principal-agent levels.This conclusion can be extended to other fields concerning public goods.
出处
《理论学刊》
北大核心
2009年第4期37-40,共4页
Theory Journal
关键词
农村供水协会
委托-代理
公共物品
rural water supply association
principal-agent
public goods