上市公司过度投资与负债控制效应研究

Study on Overinvestment and Debt Control Effects of Listed Company

基于Jensen的自由现金流量假说,在充分考虑公司成长机会和自由现金流量差异的前提下,系统地对中国上市公司过度投资与负债的控制效应进行了研究。研究结果显示,当公司存在自由现金流量时,中国上市公司倾向于过度投资,其中,代理问题最严重的高自由现金流量、低成长机会的公司过度投资倾向明显大于其他类型的公司。从对债务控制效应的检验来看,研究发现,短期债务的控制作用是显著的,而银行借款的治理效应则是弱化或恶化的,其存在非但未能缓解公司的过度投资,反而一定程度还上加重了公司的过度投资问题。

Using the general principles of Jensne＇s free cash flow hypothesis, combined with companies＇growth opportunities and difference of free cash lows, this paper conducts an systematical research on the relationships between overinvestment and debt control effects. The results indicate that overinvestment is motivated when there are free cash flows in China listed company, while the relationships between free cash flow and overinvestment is impacted on the corporate growth opportunities and the amount of free cash flow. There are relationships much stronger for the companies defined as having high free cash flow and low investment opportunities. From the debt control effect test, it is found that short term debts have strong control effect, while bank debts do not play a feeble role in governance, which deteriorate the excessive investment agent problems for listed companies but not resolve such problems.