一个完美并发签名协议的分析与改进

Analysis and Improvement of a Perfect Concurrent Signature Protocol

分析了Huang等提出的1个完美并发签名协议,设计了2种攻击方法对该协议进行攻击.结果表明,该方案存在2个安全漏洞:参与的两方A和B都有能力在并发签名产生之后伪造1个对新消息的签名;A与B都有能力独自伪造双方的并发签名.为了防止上述的伪造攻击,提出了1个改进方案,增加对关键信息的认证,并分析了改进方案的安全性.

A perfect concurrent signature protocol proposed by Huang et al in 2007 is analyzed. I wo attacks are given out to show that there are two weaknesses in Huang＇s protocol： firstly, both participators A and B can change the signed messages after the concurrent signature protocol is completed; secondly, both A and B can forge a concurrent signature themselves. To prevent such forgery attacks, an improved protocol is proposed by adding authentication to the keystone information, and then the security of the improvement is analyzed.