摘要
近年来,在国内重视"三农"问题和国际粮食危机的两大背景下,我国对粮食补贴政策进行了根本性的调整,以实现保障国家粮食安全和促进农民增收的双重目标。但是,长期以来,我国粮食安全与农民增收之间存在着不和谐音符。我国农民种粮的机会成本增加及种粮利益较低,因此将农民增收放在首位成为关键。通过博弈分析可以发现,我国政府出台的以对农民直接支付为主的粮食补贴政策在解决二者的协同问题中扮演着重要角色。
In recent years, in the environment of international grain crisis and domestic solving issues concerning agriculture, countryside and farmers, China has developed and implemented a series of grain subsidies. The main targets are the protection of national grain security and farmer income. Because of the definition of grain security and the now situation of grain industry, there is a certain lack of coordination between grain security and farmer income. In order to achieve their synergy, it firstly needs to analyze their relationship. Because of higher opportunity cost and lower farmer income, it is critical to take farmer income in the first place. Through game analysis, it can be found that current grain subsidies policy is to play an important role.
出处
《河南师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第2期116-119,共4页
Journal of Henan Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
关键词
粮食补贴政策
粮食安全
农民增收
博弈分析
grain subsidies policy
grain security
farmer income
game analysis