上市公司信息披露政策对分析师预测的多重影响研究

The Multiple Influence of Corporate Disclosure Policy on Analyst Forecast

本文选取针对2001～2007年度年报发布的分析师预测样本,以深交所信息披露考核结果以及是否按规定发布业绩预告作为衡量上市公司信息披露政策的指标,分别考察二者对于分析师预测数量及质量的影响。多元回归分析结果表明,上市公司信息披露政策越透明,则跟随其进行预测的分析师数量越多,预测的分歧度越小,准确度越高。这说明,上市公司高水平的信息披露对分析师具有重要作用,并有利于缓解资本市场的信息不对称问题。本文提示我们,深交所信息披露考核指标以及是否按规定发布业绩预告分别从不同角度体现了上市公司的信息披露政策导向;市场参与者亟待更为全面且公允的信息披露评级指标出台。

This paper examines the relation between the corporate disclosure policies, the number of analysts following each corporate, the dispersion and accuracy of analysts＇ earning forecasts. By using beth the corporate disclosure policy rating data issued by Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the fact whether a corporate disclose management earnings forecast according to the mandatory regulation as proxies for disclosure policy, the author pro- vides the evidence that firms with more informative disclosure policies have a larger analyst following, more accurate analyst forecasts, less dispersion among individual analyst forecasts. The result proves that highly transparent disclosure policy plays an important role for the analysts and capital market. Furthermore, the author points out that it is an emergent need for a well recognized index to evaluate the transparency of corporate disclosure policies, which can diminishes the information asymmetry.