“实践存在论”美学、文艺学本体观辨析——以“实践”与“存在论”关系为中心

An Analysis of the Ontology of Practical Existential Aesthetics and Literary Theories——Centering on the Relation Between Practice and Existentialism

"实践存在论"是近年出现在美学、文艺学研究领域的一种本体观。它将马克思主义的实践观与海德格尔存在主义的存在论组合起来,并伴随"实践美学"与"后实践美学"之间的争论一同展开。"实践存在论"的前身是建立在"实践唯物主义"基础上的"实践本体论"。考察经典作家的文本,可以发现"实践唯物主义"实际上是一个并不存在的概念,而美学和文艺学上的"实践本体论",看似以上述"实践唯物主义"为依据,走在唯物主义轨道上,但事实上,它的理论解释却完全落到了所谓的"实践"上面,确切地说,是落在了所谓"实践"的"能动性"上面。当"实践"的能动作用被人为地无限发挥,而对现实的物质基础却置若罔闻的时候,这种"实践"就有可能走向主体性的"精神实践"的危险。所以,"实践本体论"的说法也不能成立。因之,"实践存在论"能否存在就成了问题。从理论构成上看,"实践"与"存在"两个概念之间的关系,及其理论上共生共融的可能性,是该理论阐释的内在需要。作为美学、文艺学的本体观,它需要适合于理论上的逻辑生成法则。马克思所讲的"实践"是指人的物质劳动和革命实践,既包括最初的本源意义上物质活动和物质交往的含义,也包括在现实基础上社会活动和革命实践的含义。这里的"实践"不能理解为包容一切的活动和行为,也不能理解为是亚里士多德和康德意义上的形而上学的"道德实践"。并且"实践"是"现实的人"的物质实践与革命实践,是社会的、历史的活动,不是神秘的玄想或抽象的思辨,也不是动物式的类存在物的活动。在海德格尔那里,他的"存在"是个体的人的"存在",并不涉及马克思意义上的"实践"问题。他的"存在"只是一种"领悟"和所谓"存在之澄明",并不是指"现实的人"的"实践"。而这种"领悟"或"澄明",不过是一种主体心性的大彻大悟,是非人力所能为的。如果与马克思、恩格斯所说的通过人类劳动和实践而通达的"自由王国"相比较,那么海德格尔的"存在之澄明"则是彼岸性的,是此岸性的彼岸向往。因此,马克思主义实践观与海德格尔存在论在理论内涵和具体指向上的不同,是"实践存在论"阐释遇到的最大困难。科学的本体论只能是辩证唯物主义一元论及其历史观。"实践存在论"美学、文艺学的具体做法是:先对马克思主义的实践观进行扭曲化、狭隘化,然后将"实践"观念加以泛化,接着同海德格尔的存在主义加以比对、结合,最后,生造出所谓的"实践存在论"体系来。到了这个地步,马克思主义的实践观的内容就已基本看不见踪影了。"实践存在论"美学、文艺学有着严重的理论上的失误。

The practical existence, as a branch of ontology, appears in recent years in the field of aesthet- ics and literary theories, which combines the practice of Marxism with the existence of Heidegger＇s existentialism, accompanied by the argument between practical aesthetics and post-practical aesthetics. Its precursor is practical ontology on a basis of practical materialism. A review of classic texts can discover that, while the term of practical materialism doesnt exist actually, the practical ontology in the field of aesthetics and literary theo- ries seems to be, based on the above practical materialism, walking on the route of materialism. But, in fact, its theoretical explanation completely falls on the so-called ＂ cal activity＂. When practical activity is brought into play foundation in reality is never paid attention to, this practice practice＂, to be precise, on the so-called ＂practiartificially and unlimitedly, or when the material will dangerously become the spirit practice of subjectivity. Therefore, the argument of practical ontology does not hold water. In the same way, the term of prac- tical existence is also questionable. Judging from the theoretical structure, the relation between practice and existence as well as their symbiotic, interacted possibility, is the inner requirement of this theoretical explanation, which, as the ontology of aesthetics and literary theories, needs adopting to the logic principle in theory. Marx＇s practice refers to the human＇s material labor and revolutionary action, both including the original material activity and intercourse, and including the social activity and revolutionary action on a basis of reality. The practice here can not be considered as a comprehensive activity and behavior, or a moral practice in a sense of Aristotle and Kant. It is social, historical activity instead of mystery, abstract debate or the activity of animal- like existence. For Heidegger, his existence doesn＇t concern about Marx＇s practice. It is the ＂ clarification＂ or the so-called ＂ clarification for existence＂ instead of the human＇s practice in reality. And either the ＂ clarificaion＂ or the ＂clarification＂, in fact, belongs to the subject＇s supreme enlightenment in spirit, which can not be acquired by human. Compared with the ＂realm of freedom＂ by Marx and Engels, Heidegger＇s ＂ clarification for existence＂ is of the ＂ other river-side＂ character, that is, this river-side＇s yearning towards that river-side. Therefore, either in theoretical connotation or in detailed reference, there is the difference between Marx＇s practice and Heidegger＇s existence, which gives a great problem to the explanation of practical existence. On- tology as a science can only be the monism and historical-view of dialectical materialism. But, for the aesthetics and literary theories of practical existence, the specific way of explanation is： first, to distort and narrow the conception of Marx＇s practice ; and then, to generalize the view of practice; and then, to contrast and combine Heidegger＇s existentialism; and finally, to create the so-called system of practical existence. Up to this step, there is not Marxist practice at all. The aesthetics and literary theories of practical existence have a grave theo- retical misplay.