第三方物流服务商道德风险的防范

Keep Away from the Moral Hazard of Third Party Logistics Provider

为了有效防范单合同周期中第三方物流服务商(3PL)的道德风险,提出以3PL行业平均水准(平均服务水平、平均报酬水平)作为报酬支付标准并附带违约惩罚措施的支付方式。应用委托-代理理论分析了3PL在此支付标准和支付方式下面临的决策环境,应用最大值原理分析了3PL在该决策环境下的决策。将决策结果进一步的比较分析,并提出了具体的应用建议。

In order to efficiently keep away from the moral hazard of third party logistics provider （3PL） in a single contractual period, a demander for the service can offer payment equal to the average of 3PL industry to a supplier for his service above the industrial level with a penalty for the deviation of service level to bad state. According to the principal-agent theory, there arc three decision-making conditions for a 3PL, single contractual period, individual rationality constraint （IR）, and incentive compatibility constraint （IC）. Under these circumstances, 3PL makes a decision for his actual service level applying the principle of maximum. At the end of this article, we compare the different outcomes under several different decisions, obtain some results, and put forward some idiographic applications proposals.