基于多时期的分销渠道成员长期性努力补偿激励机制

A Study on Long-term Efforts Compensating Mechanisms of Distribution Channel Members for Being Based on More Period

研究了1个制造商和1个零售商构成的分销渠道,将零售商的服务分为短期性服务和基于顾客满意的长期性服务,由于长期性服务对销售量的影响具有滞后性,因此,建立了多时期渠道动态决策模型。在此基础上,分析了3种情况:①制造商对零售商的长期性服务不激励(CCS);②制造商对零售商的长期性服务激励(CICS);③渠道整合(CI)。结果表明:如果制造商不对零售商激励,零售商也有长期性服务偏好;如果对零售商激励,那么零售商付出的长期性服务更多,他们的努力程度由零售商利润的贴现系数决定。同时CI时,渠道总利润要优于其余2种情况。制造商对零售商激励时双方的利润均大于不激励时的利润,CI时双方的利润与他们的分配比例有关。

The distribution channel, which has one manufacturers and one retailer, was studied in the pa per. The retailer＇s service was composed of short-term service and customer satisfaction. In the paper, channel dynamic decision mode ong-term service for being based on was constituted, because long-term service affects market with delay, On the base of this, three cases were analyzed.manufacturers didn＇t incent retailer for long-term service（CCS）, manufacturer motivated retailer for long-term service（CICS）, and channel integration（CI）. The results show the retailer favors long-term service, even if manufacturers don＇t incentive retailer;The retailer pays more long-term service if manufacturers motivated retailer;Their effort is made by the retailer＇s a discounts factor to future profits. At same time, channel total profits is more than the two others in the channel integration. If manufacturers motivated retailer, manufacturer and re- tailer＇s profits are more than no incentive, In the channel integration, their profits are related with their assigning proportionment.