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基于群体行为演化角度的社会福利扩展机制解析 被引量:3

An Analysis of Social Welfare Extension System from the Perspective of Group Behavior Evolution
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摘要 经济个体之间的互惠性博弈可以改善个体的福利和博弈双方的福利总合,为"帕累托"状态下整体社会福利的改善提供了潜在的可能性。演化博弈理论为自利性群体向互惠性群体的演化提供了理论支持,从而为整体社会福利扩展的实现奠定了理论基础。根据互惠性演化模型的分析结果,当初始状态下互惠性群体的比例大于某一固定临界值时,该群体将向互惠性群体演化,最终可以实现整体社会福利的扩展。在互惠性群体的演化过程中,需要发挥包括政府在内的第三方要素的阀值性激励功能。 The reciprocal game between the economical individuals may improve the individual welfare and the total welfare of both sides of the game, which can provide the potential possibility to improve the welfare of the whole society in the "Pareto" state. The evolutionary game theory has provided the theoretical support for the evolution of self-serving groups to reciprocal group, which lays a theoretical foundation for the realizing of overall expansion of social welfare. According to the research result of the reciprocal evolution model, when the scale of the reciprocal group in the initial state is bigger than a fixed critical value, that group will evolve into a reciprocal group, so that the extension of the welfare of the whole society can be realized at last. During the evolution process of the reciprocal group, it is necessary to give full play to the inspiring function of the third-party factor including the government.
出处 《当代财经》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第5期24-27,共4页 Contemporary Finance and Economics
基金 国家社科基金资助项目"和谐社会的微观经济研究"(07BJY017)
关键词 行为经济学 社会福利 互惠性博弈 帕累托状态 演化博弈理论 behavioral economics social welfare reciprocal game "Pareto" state evolutionary game theory
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