隐性与显性存款保险制度道德风险的比较

目前我国没有建立显性的存款保险制度,但存在着对存款人的隐性保护。本文基于理论与实证两个角度比较分析两种存款保险制度道德风险的大小,结果显示,从隐性存款保险向显性存款保险转变能有效地降低银行的道德风险以及提高其监管水平。

There is not explicit deposit insurance system in China at present, but there exits implicit deposit insurance system. Based on both theory and empiricism, this paper compares the analysis size of moral hazard in two deposit insurance systems. The result shows that the transformation from implicit deposit insurance system to explicit deposit insurance system can efficiently reduce the emergence of moral hazard and improve monitoring level of bank.